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Only few historians have dared to develop a grand theory on Systems of representation.
Among those who did take this intellectual risk, Otto Hintze certainly was one of the
most influential thinkers whose ideas even more than sixty years after their publication
continue to inspire research. Here, I shall concentrate on his famous typology ofrep-
resentative institutions in which he discerns two types of Systems through Europe since
the middle ages: the two-chamber and the three-chamber parliaments. In his view, the
first type is mainly represented by England, and albeit in less clear cut forms, also by
Poland, Hungary and Scandinavia. The second and more recent type is to be found in
the Empire, Spain and France. The first type evolved directly from the king's great coun-
cil, the second developed into a differentiation of a society in which feudalism necessi-
tated a deep reconstruction of power relations from the bottom up. The new lords had
to rely on the Support of all weighty categories in their endeavour to build up a state
administration. So, Hintze saw a causal relationship between the penetration of feudal-
ism in the Carolingian core lands and the emergcnce of the second type, while the first
type was to be found in the periphery.1 Hintze's further implication that, during the
early-modern period, bicameralism led to parliamentarism and tricameralism to abso-
lutism, remains outsidc the chronological limits of this article, in which I will look es-
pecially at the medieval origins. Moreover, this aspect of the theory has already been
adequately refuted by Kersten Krüger.2
The function of a theory being to Interpret globally the available data, a sound pro-
gress of our scientific knowledge requires a steady reappraisal in the light of new findiiigs
which may have been provoked in part by the prevailing theory. Given the impressive
research of the last sixty years, it would be rather curious if a global theory could still
satisfy, encompassing all the Information wc have at hand now. I will therefore raise
thrce questions, starting from Hintze's powerfull insight:
1. Are the concrete empirical data on which he founded his theory still held to be
correct and sufficient?
2. Is his descriptive theory, based on two basic types of representation through Europe
from the middle ages to the end of the ancien regime, still to be considcred äs an
adequate schcme to Interpret the facts?
3. If not, can we offer an alternative?
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Bi- and tncameralism
The mam case in Hintze's argument evidently was England. Detailed research on thc
proceedings of the two Houses and of the careers of MPs over thc last decades has
brought about masses of matenals which niake possible a niuch closer msight m the rep-
räsentative practice than was possible sixty years ago. The reality of bicanierahsm in the
later middle agcs was marked by a far less clearly cut distinction between the Lords and
the Commons than has been assumed m the older literaturc
'Although they had their differences . the Lords and the Commons usually saw eye
to eye on mattcrs of broad pohcy. There were certamly plenty of occasions for them
to meet together and discuss thc topics of the day, smce the practice of "mter-com-
mumng" or sending delegates from one house to another was frequently employcd'.3
Not only did the two Houses look together at important political issues, the social stand-
ing of many shire knights was not always so far inferior, if ever it was, to that of their
relatives among the parliamcntary peerage. Their local power basis could not be over-
looked by either the Crown or the Lords, and they even strengthened it by advancing
petitions for their clients. The social nctworks underlymg parliamentary action could
become apparent only aftcr detailed research of the practical proceedings and thc bio-
graphies of the MPs. The more this work proceeds, the more the mstitutional clcavagcs
tend to loose their absolute character.
Political patronage has equally been put forward äs an important factor m the beha-
viour of thc Polish nobihty; in the mean time, however, a substantial difference occurs
between English bicamerahsm and that in Poland and Hungary in these kmgdoms, cities
were hardly if at all m a position of political influence, while in Westmmster their role
could not be overlooked. Moreover, regional diets played an active role in ccntral Eu-
rope, while this structure was not prominent m England 4 How legitimate, then, is it
to put bicamerahsm m both regions on an equal footmg, while the content of thc struc-
tures is so different?
The Situation in Swcden raised a problcm for Hmtze in developmg his typology, he
solved it by stating that Swcden showed 'a transformation of the old bicameral type mto
the modern three- or four-chamber type'.5 Smce the fourteenth Century, the king had
to negotiate with the Council of the Realm, the Men of the Realm and the Common-
alty of the Realm. The latter is specified in 1359 äs 'clencs, knights, squires, townsmcn,
and peasants', assembling in provincial tings. There is no indication, however, of these
last categones to have taken part in formal meetings on the level of the kingdom, which
continued to be the sake of the Lords. The political cnsis of thc 1430's, however, in
which the aristocracy was spht up mto several nval family groupmgs, created an occasion
for the awakening of political consciousness and action among the lesser nobles, the bur-
ghers, thc miners and the peasants of central Swcden. A certain level of constitutional
practice grew through the frequent royal elections in thc middle of thc 15th Century,
wherc the 'commonalty' came to bc understood äs the armed levy servmg äs a par-
liamentary body Its rolc must have been mainly that of confirming the dccisions made
by the ruling class On a regional basis, the tings including townsmcn, miners and peas-
ants, were gradually more involved in fiscal mattcrs. The grcat meetmg at Västeräs in
1527, attcnded by sixteen mcmbers of the Council, 130 'freebornnoblenien', 105 'peas-
ants' and the represcntatives of some twenty towns and seven minmg districts constitutes
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thc ultimate stage in the development of the old meetmgs of lords It answered to the
proposals of the king by 'estate', namely the entire nobility, the townsrnen and miners,
and 'the comnion man'.6 Anyhow, we are far from a formal bicameral System in any
stage of this development
Krüger concluded from his review of Scandmavian representation that Hmtze's geo-
graphical distinction between carolmgian core lands and penphcry did not fit. Sweden,
situated in the weakly feudahsed penphery, developed in fact not a bicameral but a four-
chamber systcm. The Empire, on the other haiid, the core region of carolmgian feu-
dalism, had m fact a bicameral System with the mixed clerical and noble councils of the
Electors and of the Pnnccs. In addition, the impenal eitles constituted a true estate.7
One has to obscrve, howcver, that Hintze correctly argued conccrnmg the terntorial
states, where, more than was the case in the gloomy Empire, effcctive state buildmg
took place with the formation of assemblies of two (the protestant lands), three or four
estates (Bavana and Fnsia8). Agam, the reahty of the representative structures was far
more differentiated than Hmtze's simple typology could incorporate.9
For all thc cascs classified by Hintze äs bicameral, serious objections have to be made
äs to their empincal validity Moreover, the two types which he sees äs successive stages
are m reahty much more intcrmeshed. In cases which in his view obviously belong to
the three-chamber System, their direct evolution from the enlargement of thc mon-
archical council is just äs obvious äs in England or Sweden.
The earhcst mcntion made of an mtended, although not actually hcld, assembly of
three estates datcs from 1128 in Flanders. Part of the nobility and the cities opposed to
the new count because of his repcated violations of their rights. He was urged to call a
meeting of his curia 'and let thc barons from both sides, and our peers and all the re-
sponsiblc men among thc clcrgy and thc people, comc together in peace and without
arms, and let thcmjudge' 10 A similar proccdure was apphcd by king Alfonso IX of Leon
in 1188 when hc convened 'a curia at Leon with the archbishop, the bishops and mag-
nates of my kmgdom, and with thc electcd citizcns from thc different towns'.11 Needless
to msist on the fact that thesc cascs precede the development of the English House of
Commons and that Hmtze's prcsumcd consecutive formation of thc three chamber rep-
resentation cannot be accepted äs a gencral model.
In some cases, hkc it was in the two mcntioiied before, the extension of the curia
mto a council with a broader consultative representation, did not transform it and did
not necessarily mtroducc a Splitting of the clergy and the nobility m a high and a low
chamber.
From the strategy of enlargmg the monarch's council m crisis situations thus could
cvolve or not — äs it happened in Flanders — a Variation of representative structures with
vcry different social compositions. Hmtze's classification forces this vanety mto two
types, overlookmg that similar origms produccd different outcomes already in a very
early stage, say thc thirtcenth and fourtecnth centuries, in Sweden thc fiftcenth. Insofar
äs his argumcnt rests on the vanations m the penetration of feudalism and of a state bure-
aucracy to cxplam why in some countries the sccond type grew out of the fürst and not
in others, it undcrestimates the similarities in the devclopments between countries in
western Europc. A comparativc study of the financial mstitutions from thc cleventh to
the tirteenth Century concludcs·
'We havc admittcd that the Carolmgian hentage was defmitely a molding force
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which gave common charactenstics to contmental institutions, and that the high
degree of feudalization m western Europa •was also such a forcc. But more than
common hentage and mstitutional borrowmg produccd these common features.
Degree of political power, economic resources, and local need, whether m England
or on the Contment, governed what rulers and thcir admmistrators did or could do
with their institutions. These ingredients more than hcntage and borrowmg account
for the common charactenstics of the fmancial institutions of western Europe dunng
their formative penod' 12
Is Hmtze's vicw not too cxclusively mstitutional, mdced, and even m the limited sense
of focusing on the structures, leavmg aside mstitutional practices, informal developments
and personal Implementation? Were concrete political and economic forces not mold-
ing institutions more than their traditions, äs is suggested by Lyon and Verhulst? One
could object, for instance, that Hmtze did not considcr the effects of monctanzation
and urbamzation in the gradual breaking up of feudahsm, cspecially in the most pro-
gressive areas, Northern Italy and the Netherlands. These two regions are cunously ab-
sent from Hmtze's analysis and indeed don't fit at all in his scheine. His explanatory fac-
tors obviously are strongly present m, say Lombardy: the strong pcnetration of feudalism
and the early development of rational admmistration based mainly on Roman law.
Three-chamber reprcsentation neverthelcss only devcloped in the penphcral regions of
Italy.13 In such regions äs Picdmont and Fnuli, the eitles weighcd so heavily on decision
making that they organized their mterventions m a more limited structure formed by
the major cities only, thus bypassmg the formal estates.14 Where assernblies of estates
did exist, thcir composition also vaned considerably. We noticcd the absence among
the estates of the clergy and the presence of the peasants in Sweden. In the county of
Holland, the clergy did not participate, which reduccd the estates to two.15
Recent research has brought to the light that similar Systems of urban represcntation
dcveloped in some highly urbamzcd regions, often without any referencc to a monarch
or to other estates and anyhow independent from these. Authorities of cities had thcir
own way of dealmg with the problems of trade and commerce in which they obviously
were most competent and directly mterested. Monarchs and feudal lords generally
showcd an interest in trade only from a vicwpoint of taxation and had little further un-
derstandmg of the kmd of matters merchants were dealmg with. This type of urban rep-
resentation developed m vanous shapes m regions like the coast pnncipalitics m the Low
Countnes, the Rhmeland, the Hanseatic area includmg Prussia, and in Swabia. In
Northern Italy, on the other hand, the fierce competition between the cities led to
dommation of the smaller by the largcr ones, which obviously left little space for rcp-
resentation. The fact remams, however, that the urban world creatcd a System of rep-
resentation and dommation on its own, for its own needs, and m forms dependent on
the environmcnt. Urban leagues m Alsace, the Rhmeland and Swabia partly fulfilled
similar functions of reciprocal protection agamst the feudal and monarchical powers äs
did the Hanseatic league or the mformally operatmg groups of major cities in Piedmont,
Cataloma, Flanders or Holland.16
For this section, we can conclude that the empmcal matenal available now is hardly
to accord with Hmtze's Vision. Structures were more varied than he could see and don't
fit the dichotomy of types. It is questionable if the difFerence between two- and tricam-
cral representative Systems was really all that relevant, since they all operated in practice
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in a more subtle way than onc might prcsurne on the basis of their formal structure
Real political and economic forces, especially that of the eitles, have been overlooked
by Hintze äs determinatmg factors rather than the institutional hentage A generahzing
approach will now have to take into account not only a wider vanety of representative
Systems, but also the question why these did not develop or disappeared in some regions
This negative qucstionmg will have to prevent us from leadmg mtcrpretations
A more adequate theory?
The confrontation of Hmtze's theory with our present empincal knowledge reveals that
many data had to be left aside or distorted to allow their insertioii in a bipolar typology
In my view, his scope is too narrowly focused on the formal structures, while current
research Stresses rather the day-to-day practice, mcludmg behavioural patterns of the
political personncl Hintze sees mstitutions too much in their own field, omitting the
obvious fact that they operate within a society which gives them opportumties and im-
poses some struins upon them His ideal types of representation remain thus very close
to the sphere of the political theones of the time trying to stabilise the power inequahties
on the nionarch's terms
The implication of this Vision is to overemphasise the role of assemblies of estates äs
the sole form of representation, and the dualistic character of representation äs takmg
place on the nionarch's initiative, within the limits of his territory and about the issues
relevant to him This Interpretation belongs to the strong tradition which sees devel-
opments of mstitutions mamly äs a smgle path m which converge all earlier vanations
The 'royal way' is then that of modcrmzation which m the field of political mstitutions
implies the formation of national states, ccntralised, bureaucratic and monarchical
My Interpretation will start from the close relationship of the representative mstitu-
tions with the society and the political System in which they function Types of societies
have earlier been distmguished along levels of commerciahzation and urbanization 17
Kruger has correctly pointed out that the same types of societies could lead to different
representative structures, at Icast if one sticks to their formal aspects He stressed the need
to mclude the opposite effects on social relations of the exercise ofpower by existing
political structures Moreover, the evolution ofpower Systems had been insufficiently
considered in the typological approach 18 I want to objcct that it is questionable if a for-
mahstic approach is sufHcient to get a dccper msight into the relations between the dy-
namics of societies in relation to their polities I have already pointed m this context to
the successes of senal approaches to mstitutions, considermg the prosopography of their
personnel, their agenda and practical Operation
Charles Tilly has recently proposed the dimensions accumulation and concentration
of (movable) capital to classify societies, not m rudimentary extremes but along graded
qualities The Icvcl of capital accumulation mdicates the availability of resources, the
measure of concentration determmes the number of placcs where they can be drawn
in partirular quantities In prcindustnal societies, movables allowed a far greater con-
cciitration of wealth than land, which made them more flexible means of dommation
Tilly uses these vectors to locate the various types of states, not m a bipolar typology
fixed for ccntunes but in gradual differentiation Those powers havmg the possibihty
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to extract important commercial surpluses were m a better competitive position than
their purely rural nvals. The rieh vanety of reality bnngs about ever changing multiple
combmations of these basic means of power, which can be conceptually grasped by such
a model.19 It allows a more refined operationalization of the factors urbanization and
commercialization The highest accumulations and concentrations of movable capital
are to be found in the largcst eitles.
The mteraction between powcrs will thus take place within a framcwork defined by
a certam level of accumulation and concentration of movable capital. The higher the
accumulation, the better the competitive position of a umt, the more concentrated, the
less competitors within the pohty The same factors apply to the mteractions between
state Systems. The nature and wcight of the political actors can thus be identified in a
uniform way, äs is required for any comparative research. Moreover, these mdicators
prevent us to look only from above at the political mteraction, äs is imphcitly the case
m the duahstic approach.
The ongomg process of competition for political power bnngs about the extension
of the scale of the units There is not, however, a smgle driving force of expansion The
extension by monarchs of their councils into broader layers of society when the cir-
cumstances made this unavoidable has certamly too often been considcrcd äs the ob-
viously only model of Integration of growmg political Systems. Rural commumties cre-
ated their own tics and Systems of supra-local public authonty, dependmg on their needs.
Pastorahsts for instance maintamed relations with their markets and eventually, like in
the famous case of the Castihan mcseta, built up orgamzations rcgulatmg the long dis-
tance migrations of the herds. Agnculturalists dependmg 011 Irrigation or dramagc
equally developed their own orgamzations in which public functions, including legis-
lation, tax levying andjustice took place on a strictly represcntative basis. It is noticcable
that such bottom up orgamzations grew out of meluctable practical neccssitics of natural
ongm which required sohdary action of commumties. An equitable distnbution of bur-
dcns and benefits was an absolute condition for a durable cooperation Farreachmg forms
of direct dcmocracy — mamly m proportion to the capital (land or cattle) involved —
grew undcr these conditions m the Alpine and Castihan pastures and in Holland's pol-
ders
Cities evidently created the most elaborate Systems of rcpresentatioii. The larger their
population, the more extensive their network had to bc to provide for the neccssary
foodstuffs, raw matenals and export facilities. The means of control of a hmterland varied
along the relative concentration of capital. Vemcc could colomse somc Islands m the
eastern Mediterranean, mstall pnvilcged mcrchants in numerous foreign eitles, and
dommate its direct hmterland in the Po vallcy As a süperb commercial metropolis of
about onc hundrcd thousand mhabitants, it had to deal mamly with its nval Genova
and later on with the Ottoman empire. Smaller commercial cities like Bruges or
Augsburg could obtam farreachmg mfluence in their direct cnvironmeiit but had to
ncgotiate with ncar-equal compcütors. Such was typically the case of the North-Ger-
man Hansa cities. Their orgamzation of mutual protection grew from regional leagues
äs there existed many through Europc, it could grow up to a membership of nearly two
hundrcd cities because they all operated m regions with rclatively wcak monarchical
powers However, none of the particular cities or sub-regions could force any othcr to
apply a common decision 20
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Students of representative Systems did mostly not consider these bottom up orgamza-
tions äs belonging to their field of research since these did not operate within a dualistic
model of a monarch facing estates One can hardly understand, however, the vanety
of repräsentative Systems throughout Europe if one leaves them out the fact that in an
early stage they fulfilled the functions vital to the concentration of capital which gave
them real power, preventcd other forces to interfere Even when, from the fifteenth
Century onwards, monarchical states tended to mobilise more effective means of military
and administrative power and thus could overwhelm most of the formerly independent
city-states, the pre-existmg representative structures remamed a political factor to
reckon with Onginally, such urban leagues, deputations orfcderations dealt on an equal
footmg with monarchs and their councils, concluded treaties with authonties abroad,
admimsteredjustice m long distance trade, secured their vital interests by military means
and levicd taxes to finance their activities Since the traditional monarchies could not
providc these Services by lack of expertise and mterest, the federative organizations of
communal interests created thcmselves public authonties lackmg the dualistic character
of many parliaments The orgam/ations and values, expressed in everyday hfe, of dwel-
lers of cities and villages not entirely dominated by feudal lords or monarchical admm-
istrators, have beeil labeled communahsm and are seen nowadays äs a constituent part
in the process of social Integration in Europe 21
We should therefore not reduce the idea of reprcsentation to the monarchical states,
in which the dualism often tended to cxclude one of the parties Nor should we reduce
the idea of public power m the late middle ages to the monarchical states which were
still compctmg — albeit succesfully on the long term — with city-states, urban leagues,
autonomous cities, small lordships and terntories of all kmds and sizes The scale and
type of public powers bemg diverse, so were correspondingly the modes of repre-
sentation
An intercstmg example of the possible multiplicity of partly overlapping power struc-
tures is that of Prussia under the rule of the Teutomc Order The Grand Master was a
pnncc of the Empire, the Order a member of the German Hansa Within the Vistula
bassm, the Master had to negotiate mtensely with the representatives of the cities which,
in turn, formed part of the Prussian quarter of the Hansa On the other band, the Master
reduced to a stnct mmimum meetmgs includmg the clergy and the nobility, although
the latter became indispensable in the fifteenth Century When the King of Poland ac-
quired Prussia after his victory over the Teutomc Order in 1466, he had to leave intact
the strong representative tradition the great Vistula cities had built up durmg almost two
centunes 22 A specific Situation hke this one shows agam the huge gap betwecii Hmtzc's
Vision of a bicameral Poland and histoncal reality
It seems adequate to look at the forms of representation from bottom up since the
local and regional structures were the clements to be represented The strongcr their
original — i c previous to the incorporation in a territorial state — power, the more
weight they contmued to have in the larger unity Representation could occur on the
initiative of the basic umts in the way of the construction of broader cooperation, äs in
the cases of rural orgamzation for water control or transhumance of herds In those cases
where representation took placc in a context of an established terntonal power, it may
have reflected the neccssity ofthat power to deal with the pre-cxisting and still real con-
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centrations ofaccumulated capital within its temtory Omitting to do so would probably
have led to forms of active resistance by thcse.
Within villages and towns, commumty assemblies constituted the pnmary form of
representation. Those adult men possessmg a fixed amount of wealth represented the
whole commumty in decisions havmg financial implications. For judicial matters, the
rcstnction on membership by wealth may even have been totally absent. Their assembly
guaranteed the customary law and acted in front of higher authonties to defend them.
Given the more complex social and economic structure of cities, their councils de-
veloped a far rnore elaborate network of relations, orgam/ations and actions to protect
the vital interests of their population. The major cities extended their sphere of influence
over wide hmtcrlands and long distance routes, which had to bring them mto contact
— m a non-hierarchical relationship — with similar and difFerent authorities abroad. In
that perspcctive are to be understood the vanous regional hansa's, sea consulates, urban
treaties and leagues Fundamentally, they all aimed at the füll unfolding of the cities'
economic interests, which implied protection of traffics and the elaboration of trade
agreements with partners.
Smce the urban networks operated on a regional or even Continental scale, thcy were
rather than rural communities in a position to encounter the claims of monarchical
powers. On a territorial scale, this took the form of negotiations about taxes and pnvi-
leges. On a supra-regional scale, like the connicts between the German Hansa and the
kings of Denmark, diplomacy and war äs its logical continuation were the normal means
of intcraction. Townsmen were certamly not inherently democratic: when thcy had an
evident overweight, they used it, äs did the Italian metropoles towards their colomes,
the smaller cities and their contado, or the Flemish cities towards the minor towns and
villages in their quarter. Agam, the level and concentration of capital accumulation helps
us to explain the vanation Where existed a balance of power, äs m the case of the Hansa
cities, none of which was able to dommate the others, consultation on the basis of vol-
untary participation and commitment was the rule. Dcconccntration of capital thus fur-
thercd representation. Followmg the same logic, the character of representation within
monarchical territones and emerging states depended on the social structure, especially
the level of capital accumulation and its concentration. The incorporation of loosely
structured societies — which are typically those with a low level of accumulation — mto
a major polity creatcd minimal problems of Integration but, on the othcr band, offered
also littlc returns to the centre. Inverscly, highly structured societies were hard to m-
corporate directly and their pre-existing organization had to be handled with care and
due tolerance to the local and regional interests. But then, much higher capital flows
could be extracted from these concentrated accumulations.
In this respect, institutional traditions loosc their importance Three estates assemblies
have been introduced in the county of Flandcrs by the rulmg duke of Burgundy in 1400
only; howevcr, this new Institution did not replace or even rcduce the much older and
much more active informal representation of the major cities. Form follows function,
äs say designcrs. Estates could represent the distribution of power in societies, but did
not fit to all. A huge accumulation and concentration of capital withm a region always
led to a political expression of this power in the cities· by Icague, representation or domi-
nation, depending on the balance of powers. The institutional form should not prevent
us to see the practical ways of exerting power.
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As the growth of state power implied that stronger central bureaucracies ruled over
larger territones, the position of representative msitutions within them was far from un-
challenged State makers gradually sought to elinunate the need to recur to the estates
for subsidies. They were more successful in the larger territones smce a. concentrations
of capital are per defimtion lirmted to relatively small areas, b assemblies were hardly
effective äs means of contmuous control smce they were hampered by long traveling
and slow commumcation; c. opportumties for extracting resources were mostly varied
in large areas On the other band, it lemained difficult for burcaucratic centies to control
effectively extraordinary high capital concentrations, äs show examples like London,
Gdansk and Barcelona Representative powers in all such cases were modeled to
preserve the specific sphere of autonomy for these metropoles.
If we consider the role of representative institutions äs expressions of capital accum-
niulatioii and concentration, the incorporation in growing states had to interfere with
their fuiictionmg These states built up an apparatus with cver more sophisticated means
of penetrating the society and, so far äs possible, to eliminate all mtermediary power
structurcs on which restcd the representative System. Pressures of administrative, pol-
itical, judicial and ultimately military nature bccame available to the centralised states
which took pro fit of economies of scale Agam, shifts in the capital distnbution give us
the key to a fuller understandmg of the dynamics, not oiily the forrns of representation.
We may conclude that Hmtze's highly stimulating theory has now to be disnussed äs
bemg at variance with too many empirical data and madequate äs a description smce
too iiarrowly focused on the mstitutional structurcs withm a smgle duahstic pattern of
monarchical power Instead, we proposc a dyiiamic model in which the power centres
of various types are located in functioii of the relative level and concentration of movable
capital. The nature of representation is dcpendcnt on the spread of capital, albeit that
each power System, oiice in place, will tend to keep the relations in its favour Only
stroiig dynamism withm the society can force polities to open up to new claims
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